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Abstract 
 
This study examines the productivity growth of the nationwide banks of China over 
the ten years to 2006. Using a bootstrap method for the Malmquist index estimates of 
productivity growth are constructed with appropriate confidence intervals. The paper 
adjusts for the quality of the output by accounting for the non-performing loans on the 
balance sheets and test for the robustness of the results by examining alternative sets 
of outputs. The productivity growth of the state-owned banks is compared with the 
Joint-stock banks and it determinants evaluated. The paper finds that average 
productivity of the Chinese banks improved modestly over this period. Adjusting for 
the quality of loans, by treating NPLs as an undesirable output, the average 
productivity growth of the state-owned banks was zero or negative  while productivity 
of the Joint-Stock banks was markedly higher.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Banking efficiency and banking reform is a vogue topic among Chinese 
scholars. Banking sector reform in China, which has been a gradual and on-going 
process since 1978, has provided Chinese researchers with ample material for the 
study of efficiency dynamics in banking. A further stage of reform was announced in 
1993 with the objective of creating an efficient and commercial banking sector. 
Following the conditions of the WTO, in theory the Chinese banking market has been 
open to foreign competition since the end of 2006. Chinese banks have also been 
encouraged to allow foreign banks and investors to take minority shareholding 
positions. The listing of three of the big four banks on the international exchange 
during 2006-7 has been heralded as a financial success not only because of the 
injection of foreign capital but also foreign managerial expertise to improve bank 
management, performance and productivity. Given the acceptance strategic 
investment by foreign banks in the smaller commercial banks; it is no surprise that 
bank efficiency in China has become a popular topic of research in recent years.  
There have been a number of studies of banking efficiency that have been 
published in Chinese scholarly journals 1, but to date only a few studies are available 
to non-Chinese readers2. The gradualist reforms of the banking sector and the 
potential of foreign competition would be expected to improve efficiency and 
productivity in the banking sector. Signs of improvement in the Chinese banking 
sector have included improved profitability and declining non-performing loans and 
objective evidence of improved performance has begun to emerge 3. 
                                                 
1 For example Qing and Ou, (2001); Xu, Junmin, and Zhensheng, (2001); Wei and Wang, (2000); Xue and Yang, (1998) and 
Zhao (2000) have used non-parametric methods while Liu and Song (2004), Zhang, Gu and Di (2005), Sun (2005) and Qian 
(2003) have used parametric methods. 
2 A recent exception is a study using non-parametric methods by Chen et. al. (2005) and parametric methods by Fu and 
Heffernan (2005) 
3 See Fu and Heffernen (2006) and Matthews et al (2007a) (2007b) 
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This paper examines the productivity of the nationwide banks in China using 
the Malmquist index approach for the period 1997-2006. The Malmquis t index has 
the advantage of being able to decompose productivity growth into technological 
change, which captures any expansion in the production frontier, from efficiency 
improvement, which captures the movement towards the efficient frontier. One of the  
problems associated with this approach is that it is constructed within the framework 
of Data Envelope Analysis (DEA), which in turn is a non-parametric linear 
programming method that applies observed input and output data to create a ‘best 
practice’ frontier. A further problem with the use of DEA is that it does not account 
for the quality of the output of a bank, which will depend to some extent on the 
number non-performing loans on its book.  
This research has three objectives. First, it aims to measure the productivity of 
the nationwide operating banks in China. Second, it considers non-performing loans 
as an undesirable output. Third, it addresses the problem of inference inherent in the 
use of DEA as a measure of relative performance. The main drawback of the DEA 
approach is that it assumes the inputs and outputs are measured without error and 
therefore do not permit statistical evaluation. This paper provides an inferential 
capability to the point-estimates of productivity through the use of non-parametric 
bootstrapping methods.  
This paper is organized on the following lines. The next section outlines the 
background to the Chinese banking system. Section 3 discusses the methodology and 
literature relating to the Malmquist method of estimating bank productivity.  Section 4 
presents the banking data. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes.  
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2. Chinese Banking 
 In 2006, the Chinese banking system consisted of 19,797 institutions, 
including 3 policy banks, 4 large state-owned commercial banks (SOB),  12 joint-
stock commercial banks (JSB), 113 city commercial banks (CCB), 14 locally 
incorporated foreign bank subsidiaries and the rest made up of urban and rural credit 
cooperatives and other financial institutions. 
 Like many economies that have undeveloped financial and capital markets, the 
banking sector in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation. Table 1 below 
shows that the ratio of total bank assets to GDP has increased from 126%, in 1997, to 
206% in 2006. The market remains is absolutely dominated by the four state owned 
banks, although their share of the market has been decreasing steadily through 
competition from the other commercial banks (JSB and CCB).  
 
Table 1: The Chinese banking Market 
Variable 1997 2000 2006 
Total Assets to 
GDP 
125.6% 147.1% 205.8%a 
SOB Employment 
 
1,394.8 thousand 1,4936.3 thousand 
 
1,336.8 thousand 
SOB Market share 
% assets 
88.0% 71.4% 51.0% 
NPL ratio SOB 
only 
52.7% 31.5% 9.3% 
ROAA SOB* 0.93% 0.78% 0.67% 
NIM SOB* 1.8% 1.5% 2.5% 
Cost-Income Ratio 
SOB* 
48.2% 59.6% 43.3% 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Individual Bank Annual Accounts, China Regulatory 
Banking Corporation website, Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, Fitch-Bankscope data base, 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, * weighted average by asset share, a estimated 
 
Return on average assets (ROAA) and net- interest margins (NIM) of the SOBs are 
respectable by Western standards but are well below levels that would be consistent 
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with economies in the same stage of development (as for example India where NIM 
would be in the region of 3.5%). Part of the problem is that interest rates were heavily 
controlled during this period and partly the large amount of non-performing loans on 
the books of the commercial banks. However, the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio 
of the SOBs has been falling, from 53% in 1997 to 9% in 2006.  
With the encouragement of the regulatory authorities, Chinese banks have in 
recent years, had to restructure their balance sheet, develop modern risk management 
methods, improve capitalization, diversify earnings, reduce costs and improve 
corporate governance and disclosure4. Faced with the potential of increased 
competition from the end of 2006, the commercial banks have begun the process of 
restructuring and reducing unit costs. Employment in the state-owned banks has 
declined in recent years and the major banks have worked to reduce costs as shown in 
the reduction in the average cost-income ratio. 
  Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under the 
government and its agencies5. Under state control, the banks in China served the 
socialist plan of directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference 
rather than commercial imperative. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial 
institutions were allowed to take a stake in selected Chinese banks. While control of 
individual Chinese banks remain out of reach for the foreign institution6, the pressure 
to reform management, consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and 
reduce unit costs has increased with greater foreign exposure. Table 2 shows the 
extent of foreign ownership of individual banks.  
  
                                                 
4 CBRC Annual Report 2006 http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/home/jsp/index.jsp  
5 According to La Porta, et. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under the control of the 
government in 1995. 
6 There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single investor, except in the case of 
joint-venture banks 
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Table 2: Foreign Bank Ownership Stake 
Chinese Bank Foreign Bank  Stake – first acquisition 
Bank of Beijing 
 
ING  19.2% - Aug 2007 
Bank of Shanghai HSBC (8%) and other 
foreign institutions 
18.0% - Dec 2001 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank 
Citigroup(4.6%), Barclays, J 
P Morgan, Morgan Stanley 
5.3% -  Dec 2003 
Tianjin City Commercial 
Bank 
ANZ 20% - July 2006 
Industrial Bank Hang Seng (12.8%), Tetrad 
Ventures 
20.8% - April 2004 
Bank of Communications HSBC (19.9%), Barclays, J 
P Morgan,  
21.5% - June 2004 
Xian City Comm. Bank Scotia Bank  
 
12.4% - Oct 2004 
Jinan City Comm. Bank C Bank of Australia  
 
11% - Nov 2004 
Shenzen Develop. Bank  Seahaven (17.9%), Barclays, 
Nikko Asset Management 
19.3% - Dec 2004 
China Minsheng Bank Fullerton (7.9%), Barclays, J 
P Morgan 
8.9% - Jan 2005 
Hangzhou City Com Bank C Bank of Australia  19.9% - June 2007 
 
China Construction Bank Bank of America (8.5%) 
Fullerton, Other foreign 
15.2% - June 2005 
Bank of China RBS-China(8.3%), 
Fullerton, Other foreign 
20.6% - Aug 2005 
ICBC Goldman Sachs, Allianz, 
American Express  
8.45% - Aug 2005 
Nanjing City Com. Bank BNP Paribas  
 
19.2% - Oct 2005 
China Bohai Bank 
 
Standard Charter Bank 20.0% - Dec 2006 
Guangdong Development 
Bank 
Citigroup (20%), IBM 24.7% - Dec 2006 
Hua Xia Bank Deutsche bank (9.9%) 
Sal Oppenheim Jr 
14.0% - Oct 2005 
   Source: Business Week October 31, 2005 and Fitch Bankscope 
 
The theory of market contestability (Baumol, 1982) suggests that incumbent banks 
will restructure weak balance sheets, reduce costs, and improve efficiency in 
preparation for the threat of entry. Chinese banks should exhibit less inefficiency, and 
  
7 
 
strong productivity improvements between the periods 1997 and 2006, with marked 
improvements in the latter years. 
 
3. Methodology and Literature  
Data Envelope Analysis can be used to evaluate the efficiency of a firm by comparing 
it with a ‘best practice’ or output efficient firm. An output efficient firm is one that 
cannot increase its output unless it also increases one or more of its input, whereas an 
output inefficient  firm is one that can increase its output without increasing its inputs. 
An output efficient  firm would have a score of 100% as being located on the output 
efficient frontier whereas an output inefficient firm would be inside the frontier and 
have a score of less than 100%. Similarly an input efficient firm is one that cannot 
reduce its inputs without reducing its output whereas an input inefficient firm can. 
The major drawback of the DEA approach is that the efficiency scores 
obtained from a particular sample are confined to that particular sample and cannot be 
compared with another sample in a different time period. This limitation does not 
allow the measurement of productivity growth, which allows for improvement in 
efficiency as well as technical progress. 
The idea of comparing the input of a decision making unit over two periods of 
time (period 1 and period 2) by which the input in period 1 could be decreased 
holding the same level of output in period 2 is the basis of the Malmquist Index7. Färe 
et al. (1994) developed a Malmquist productivity measure using the DEA approach 
based on constant returns to scale. The Malmquist productivity index (M) enables 
                                                 
7 Grosskopf (2003) provides a brief history of the Malmquist productivity index and discusses the theoretical and empirical 
issues related to the index. For the decomposition of Malmquist productivity index, see Lovell (2003). 
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productivity growth to be decomposed into changes in efficiency (catch-up) and to 
changes in technology (innovation) 8.  
An illustration using the one input one output case is shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Points A and B represent observations in period’s t and t+1 respectively. The rays 
from the origin St  and St+1 represent frontiers of production for period’s t and t+1 
respectively. Relative efficiency is measure in one of two ways. The relative 
efficiency of production of a firm at point A compared to the frontier St is described 
by the distance function dt(yt,xt) = 0a/0b. But compared with the period t+1 frontier 
St+1 , it is dt+1(yt,xt) = 0a/0c. The relative efficiency of production of a firm at point B 
compared to the period t+1 frontier St+1 is dt+1(yt+1,xt+1) = 0d/0e. Compared with the 
                                                 
8 A further decomposition can be conducted by separating the change in efficiency into the change in pure efficiency x change in 
scale efficiency. The change in efficiency is constructed under CRS while the change in pure efficiency and scale efficiency is 
constructed under VRS. See Ray and Desli (1997) 
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period t frontier St, the relative efficiency is dt(yt+1,xt+1) = 0d/0c. The Malmquist index 
(M) of total factor productivity change is the geometric mean of the two indices based 
on the technology for period’s t+1 and t respectively.  In other words: 
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In their study of productivity growth in industrialised countries, Färe et al (1994) 
decompose (2) for changes in efficiency (catch up) and changes in frontier technology 
(innovation). This can be seen by expressing (2) as: 
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where 
M = the Malmquist productivity index 
Et+1 = a change in relative efficiency over the period t and t+1  
Tt+1 = a measure of technical progress measured by shifts in the frontier from period t 
to t+1 
When M > 1 it means that there has been a positive total factor productivity 
change between period t and t+1. When M < 1 it means that there has been a negative 
total factor productivity change.  
The use of the Malmquist method of evaluating productivity performance of 
banks has been a growth area of academic enquiry. Berg et al (1992) examined 
Norwegian banks 1980-89 and found productivity regress prior to deregulation and 
strong productivity gains due to catch-up after deregulation. The Malmquist 
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decomposition was used by Wheelock and Wilson (1999) to examine bank 
productivity in the USA for the period 1984-93. They report a general drop in average 
productivity caused by failure to catch-up with outward shifts of the production 
frontier.  Alam (2001) found that the deregulation period resulted in a productivity 
surge in the first half of the 1980s followed by a productivity regress in the second 
half for large US banks. These results were confirmed by Mukhe rjee et al (2001) who 
also uses panel estimation to explain productivity growth in terms of bank size, 
product-mix and capitalisation.  
Other studies of bank productivity using the Malmquist method have been Drake 
(2001) for the UK, Grifell-Tatjéand Lovell (1997) for Spain, Canhoto and Dermine 
(2003) for Portugal, Noulas (1997) for Greece and Isik and Hassan (2003) for Turkey. 
A pan-European study was conducted by Casu et al (2004) who compare parametric 
with the Malmquist method. There finding is that productivity growth in European 
banking has been largely brought about by technological change rather than efficiency 
improvement. Outside Europe, Worthington (1999) found that Australian Credit 
Unions exhibited strong technological progress after deregulation and Neal (2004) 
found that productivity improvements were mostly shifts in the frontier with the 
majority of banks having negative catch-up over 1995-99.   
The application of bootstrapping methods to the Malmquist productivity index is 
an ongoing area of research (Lothgreen and Tambour, 1999). Relatively few studies 
have applied bootstrapping methods to measure banking productivity. Gilbert and 
Wilson calculate confidence intervals for estimates of productivity in Korean banks in 
1980-94 and conclude that the period had experienced significant productivity growth 
against the null hypothesis of no change between periods. Tortosa-Ausina et al 
(2008), apply bootstrapping to Spanish savings banks over 1992-1998 and confirm the 
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common finding that productivity growth is dominated by technological progress in 
the post deregulation period. Murillo-Melchor et al (2005) conduct a European wide 
study of bank productivity over the period 1995-2001 using bootstrap techniques. 
They confirm the basic finding of Casu et al (2004) that productivity gains were 
driven by technological progress but find significant differences in inter-country 
performance9. 
 
4.  Banking data 
This study employs annual data (1997-2006) for 14 banks; four state-owned banks 
(SOB), and ten national joint-stock commercial banks (JSB). Data for one of the joint-
stock banks was unavailable for 2004 - 2006 (China Everbright); and in those years 
13 banks data were used. The total sample consisted of 137 bank-year observations. 
The main source of the data was Fitch/Bankscope. Other sources were individual 
annual reports of banks and the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (various  
issues). The choice of banks was based on the fact that they face a common market 
and compete nationwide.  
Two approaches are normally taken in determining what constitutes bank 
input and output. The intermediation approach recognises the main function of the 
bank is to conduct financial intermediation. Under the intermediation approach, bank 
assets measure outputs and liabilities measure inputs.  In contrast, the production 
approach recognises that the bank provides intermediation services and payment 
services to depositors. In the production approach, physical entities such as labour and 
capital are inputs while deposits are a measure of output. Goldschmidt (1981) argues 
that deposits are both inputs and outputs depending on its use in intermediation 
                                                 
9 Alam (2001) also uses bootstrap confidence intervals to provide an inferential capacity to the point 
estimates of productivity of large US banks. 
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services or payments services and suggests a weighting mechanism similar to the 
divisia mechanism of Barnett (1984). Such a separation would need information about 
the term maturity of deposits. This information is not easily available for banks in 
China and in any case up until very recently deposit interest rates were regulated and 
did not reflect market fundamentals.  
In this study, we consider four types of models. Model 1 is one where there 
are two inputs, the number of employees (LAB), and fixed assets (FA) and four 
outputs, total deposits (DEP), total loans (LOANS), other earning assets (OEA), and 
non- interest income (NII). Model 2 is one where there are 3 inputs (LAB, FA, DEP) 
and three outputs selected under the intermediation approach (LOANS, OEA, NII) 
Although non- interest income remains undeveloped in China, it is selected to reflect 
the growing contribution of this area to banks’ total income.  
Following Park and Weber (2006), we also separate desirable from 
undesirable outputs. Park and Weber (2006) consider loans less non-performing loans 
(NPLs) as well as deposits as a valid output of the bank in their study of bank 
productivity in Korea, where NPLs are viewed as an undesirable output. Stripping out 
non-performing loans from the stock of loans for each bank creates a new output 
variable (LOANSQ) which replaces total loans in models 1 and 2 to create models 3 
and 4 respectively.  
Another argument for adjusting loans for NPLs is to mitigate the effect of the 
large loan portfolios held by the big-4 SOBs on the efficiency calculation. The 
unadjusted loan portfolio would bias the efficiency score upwards for the SOBs which 
have the largest share of loans but also the highest proportion of NPLs.  
The availability of uniform and comparable data on Chinese banking is a very 
recent development. Researchers have typically made a number of working 
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assumptions to fill the gaps in data. In general, balance sheet data are available 
although the data revisions alter the figures from year to year and up until recently the 
accounting standards of Chinese banks differed from international standards (Ng and 
Turton 2001). Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the input and output data for 
the full sample 1997-2006 as an indicator of the scale of the variables used. The high 
standard deviation and the range of the figures is an indication of the dominance of 
the 4 state owned banks. 
 
Table3: Output-Input Variables 1997 - 2006 (million RMB) per bank/year 
 
Variable Description Mean  SD  Min Max 
LOANS 
RMB mill 
Total stock 
of loans 
721175 935119 5915 3533978 
OEA 
RMB mill 
Investments 
 
472282 690894 9198 3790661 
NII 
RMB mill 
Net Fees and 
Commissions 
1730 3400 -3386 16344 
LOANSQ 
RMB mill 
Loans less 
NPLs 
568421 762874 1290 3400040 
LAB Total 
Employed 
112119 170526 1186 541525 
DEP 
RMB mill 
Total stock 
of Deposits 
1157869 1548240 16522 6802964 
FA 
RMB mill 
Fixed assets 
 
21409 29099 356 112272 
 Sources: Fitch/Bankscope, Almanac of China's Finance and Banking  (various) and author calculations 
from web sources. 
 
Since we are examining the movements in productivity over a period of nine 
years, the nominal values of data were deflated by the consumer price index.  
   
 5. Empirical Results 
Tables 4a - d show the estimates of total factor productivity and its 
decomposition under CRS for each of the banks in the data set for the full period 
1997-2006. In this exercise the availability of a full balanced panel meant that only 13 
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banks were used. The tables also reports the 95% confidence intervals for each 
estimate obtained from 1000 bootstrap generations for each bank following the 
methodology of Simar and Wilson (1999). A ‘*’ by each estimate denotes that it is 
significantly biased (outside the standard error band). The banks have been grouped 
into the 4 SOBs, the 5 top JSBs and the 5 bottom JSBs. Tables 4 a-c show that out of 
156 estimates of the Malmquist productivity growth and decomposition, 102 have 
significant statistical bias. It is clear therefore that little confidence can be placed on 
the point estimates of total factor productivity in using the 4 variants of inputs and 
outputs.  
Table 4 a: Productivity Measures, Model 1, Standard error bounds in 
parenthesis 
 
Bank 
 
Malmquist Catch-up Frontier shift 
Agricultural Bank 
of China 
0.4621 
(0.4363, 0.6859) 
0.6296 
(0.4300, 0.7389) 
0.7341 
(0.7305, 1.2099) 
Bank of China 
 
1.0621* 
(1.3761, 1.7874) 
1.5543* 
(0.7425, 1.4656) 
0.6833* 
(0.9278, 2.0212) 
China Construction 
Bank 
0.3116 
(0.2545, 0.4180) 
0.4436 
(0.3050, 0.5217) 
0.7024 
(0.6215, 1.0199) 
Industrial Bank Co 
Ltd 
0.4894* 
(0.7372, 1.3205) 
1.0000 
(0.6335, 1.6044) 
0.4894* 
(0.6561, 1.2327) 
    
Bank of 
Communication 
0.9259 
(0.6883, 0.9761) 
1.0423* 
(0.4715, 0.8599) 
0.8883* 
(1.0231, 1.5074) 
CITIC Industrial 
Bank 
0.6281* 
(1.3119, 2.0213) 
1.0000 
(0.5361, 1.1254) 
0.4894* 
(1.3931, 2.7048) 
China Merchant 
Bank 
0.5592* 
(0.9006, 1.5268) 
1.0000* 
(0.4588, 0.9739) 
0.5592* 
(1.1502, 2.3151) 
Shanghai-Pudong 
Development Bank 
0.5942* 
(0.7556, 1.1320) 
1.0000 
(0.5105, 1.0343) 
0.5942* 
(0.9303, 1.5676) 
China Minsheng 
Bank 
0.6499* 
(0.9083, 1.3805) 
1.0000 
(0.6441, 1.2821) 
0.64992* 
(0.9751, 1.4536) 
    
Industrial Bank Co 
Ltd 
0.4894* 
(0.7372, 1.3205) 
1.0000 
(0.6335, 1.6044) 
0.4894* 
(0.6561, 1.2327) 
Hua Xia Bank 
 
0.7093* 
(0.9560, 1.4560) 
1.0466 
(0.6129, 1.2131) 
0.6777* 
(1.0582, 1.6218) 
Shenzhen 
Development Bank 
0.2175* 
(0.4585,0.7715) 
0.4805 
(0.3422, 0.7243) 
0.4527* 
(0.8317, 1.4134) 
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Guangdong 
Development Bank 
0.7846* 
(0.8366, 1.1353) 
0.9739 
(0.7654, 1.2902) 
0.8056 
(0.7992, 1.374) 
Table 4 b: Productivity Measures, Model 2, Standard error bounds in 
parenthesis 
 
Bank 
 
Malmquist Catch-up Frontier shift 
Agricultural Bank 
of China 
1.0036* 
(0.8485, 0.9465) 
0.9486 
(0.8897, 1.0510) 
1.0579* 
(0.8601, 0.9919) 
Bank of China 
 
1.0280 
(0.9646, 1.3188) 
1.0000 
(0.6089, 1.0397) 
1.0280* 
(1.1270, 1.6736) 
China Construction 
Bank 
1.0431 
(0.9046, 1.0864) 
1.0602 
(1.0069, 1.2527) 
0.9839* 
(0.7978, 0.9675) 
Industrial and 
Comm Bank China 
1.1170* 
(0.8838, 1.0331)  
1.0020 
(0.8156, 1.0058) 
1.1148 
(0.9634, 1.1446) 
    
Bank of 
Communication 
0.9259 
(0.6883, 0.9761) 
1.0423* 
(0.4715, 0.8599) 
0.8883* 
(1.0231, 1.5074) 
CITIC Industrial 
Bank 
0.6281* 
(1.3119, 2.0213) 
1.0000 
(0.5361, 1.1254) 
0.4894* 
(1.3931, 2.7048) 
China Merchant 
Bank 
0.7499* 
(1.0295, 1.4790) 
1.0000 
(0.5783, 1.1059) 
0.7499* 
(1.1757, 1.8527) 
Shanghai-Pudong 
Development Bank 
0.5942* 
(0.7556, 1.1320) 
1.0000 
(0.5105, 1.0343) 
0.5942* 
(0.9303, 1.5676) 
China Minsheng 
Bank 
0.6499* 
(0.9083, 1.3805) 
1.0000 
(0.6441, 1.2821) 
0.64992* 
(0.9751, 1.4536) 
    
Industrial Bank Co 
Ltd 
1.2107 
(1.0093, 1.8375) 
1.0000* 
(0.2596, 0.8031) 
1.2107* 
(2.0305, 3.4981) 
Hua Xia Bank 
 
0.7093* 
(0.9560, 1.4560) 
1.0466 
(0.6129, 1.2131) 
0.6777* 
(1.0582, 1.6218) 
Shenzhen 
Development Bank 
0.7150* 
(0.7507,1.0617) 
0.9809 
(0.9279, 1.5380) 
0.7290 
(0.6284, 0.8519) 
Guangdong 
Development Bank 
0.7846* 
(0.8366, 1.1353) 
0.9739 
(0.7654, 1.2902) 
0.8056 
(0.7992, 1.374) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
16 
 
 
Table 4 c: Productivity Measures, Model 3, Standard error bounds in 
parenthesis. 
 
Bank 
 
Malmquist Catch-up Frontier shift 
Agricultural Bank 
of China 
0.3847* 
(0.3874, 0.6276) 
0.5236 
(0.3389, 0.6070) 
0.7347* 
(0.7928, 1.3809) 
Bank of China 
 
1.0627* 
(1.3868, 1.8048) 
1.5543* 
(0.7126, 1.4605) 
0.6833* 
(0.9209, 2.1134) 
China Construction 
Bank 
0.2264 
(0.1952, 0.3440) 
0.3172 
(0.1691, 0.3548) 
0.7136* 
(0.7498, 1.3435) 
Industrial and 
Comm Bank China 
0.6195* 
(0.7269, 1.1843) 
0.9258 
(0.5826, 1.0977) 
0.6691* 
(0.8202, 1.4910) 
    
Bank of 
Communication 
1.0276* 
(1.9608, 3.1976) 
1.7090* 
(0.8470, 1.6662) 
0.6013* 
(1.4537, 2.7264) 
CITIC Industrial 
Bank 
0.5449* 
(1.8324, 2.7091) 
1.0000 
(0.5347, 1.1527) 
0.5449* 
(1.7883, 3.8510)  
China Merchant 
Bank 
0.5746* 
(0.8876, 1.5353) 
1.0000* 
(0.4406, 0.9721) 
0.5746* 
(1.1544, 2.3589) 
Shanghai-Pudong 
Development Bank 
1.7830* 
(0.8117, 1.5887) 
1.0000* 
(0.0225, 0.2021) 
1.7830* 
(6.1013, 16.9400) 
China Minsheng 
Bank 
0.3847* 
(1.2096, 1.9079) 
0.8131 
(0.4365, 0.9262) 
0.4731* 
(1.5395, 3.1522) 
    
Industrial Bank Co 
Ltd 
0.4974* 
(0.8627, 1.5605) 
1.0000 
(0.5769, 1.5683) 
0.4974* 
(0.7606, 1.571) 
Hua Xia Bank 
 
0.4087* 
(1.759, 2.7824) 
0.9979 
(0.5516, 1.1367) 
0.4096* 
(1.8503, 3.6536) 
Shenzhen 
Development Bank 
0.2194* 
(0.4682, 0.8424) 
0.4128 
(0.2041, 0.5287) 
0.5314* 
(1.2121, 2.4761) 
Guangdong 
Development Bank 
0.4253* 
(0.5894, 1.0280) 
0.6073 
(0.3294, 0.7123) 
0.6345* 
(1.0925, 2.0750) 
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Table 4 d: Productivity Measures, Model 4, Standard error bounds in 
parenthesis. 
 
Bank 
 
Malmquist Catch-up Frontier shift 
Agricultural Bank 
of China 
0.4974* 
(0.7083, 0.9396) 
0.4461 
(0.3099, 0.4644) 
1.1151* 
(1.754, 2.5327) 
Bank of China 
 
1.0280* 
(1.1311, 1.8204) 
1.0000 
(0.6098, 1.0099) 
1.0280* 
(1.5509, 2.3578) 
China Construction 
Bank 
0.5242* 
(0.6633, 0.9885) 
0.4251 
(0.2239, 0.4551) 
1.2332* 
(1.8189, 3.1432) 
Industrial and 
Comm Bank China 
0.5205* 
(0.5934, 0.8620) 
0.3920* 
(0.1800, 0.3875) 
1.32377* 
(1.8985, 3.3426) 
    
Bank of 
Communication 
0.9442* 
(1.0735, 1.6368) 
0.9672* 
(0.4055, 0.8915) 
0.9762* 
(1.4834, 2.7995) 
CITIC Industrial 
Bank 
0.8718* 
(2.1857, 4.4171) 
1.0004 
(0.5667, 1.1919) 
0.8715* 
(2.2100, 5.4806)  
China Merchant 
Bank 
0.7762* 
(1.5344, 2.3761) 
1.0000 
(0.5933, 1.1702) 
0.7762* 
(1.5909, 2.8590) 
Shanghai-Pudong 
Development Bank 
2.4432 
(1.8925, 4.1542) 
1.0000* 
(-0.0561, 0.4120) 
2.4432 
(2.0436, 41.644) 
China Minsheng 
Bank 
0.8922* 
(1.7427, 3.6739) 
1.0000 
(0.7186, 1.4233) 
0.8922* 
(1.6044, 3.5296) 
    
Industrial Bank Co 
Ltd 
1.2846* 
(1.6997, 3.4786) 
1.0000* 
(0.2804, 0.7386) 
1.2846* 
(3.7000, 6.6736) 
Hua Xia Bank 
 
0.8463* 
(1.9575, 3.4540) 
1.0547 
(0.6823, 1.3436) 
0.8024* 
(1.7472, 3.7025) 
Shenzhen 
Development Bank 
0.7492* 
(1.0595, 2.1492) 
0.5636 
(0.2986, 0.6328) 
1.3294* 
(2.0061, 5.0530) 
Guangdong 
Development Bank 
0.6581* 
(0.9730, 1.4484) 
0.6687 
(0.3897, 0.7972) 
0.9841* 
(1.4231, 2.7491) 
Mean estimates were obtained from 1000 bootstrap generations for each pair 
of years for the 14 banks for the period 1997-2003 and 13 banks for 2004-2006. To 
make the presentation easier, the 14 banks were sub-divided into the big-4 SOBs, the 
next largest five banks and the bottom five banks. Tables 5 a – c report the weighted 
(by asset share) mean values of the bias adjusted bootstrap estimates of the models for 
the Malmquist productivity index, increase in efficiency (catch-up) and technical 
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progress with indicators of statistical significance. An indicator of significance states 
that the bias-corrected estimate is significantly different from unity (no change). 
Table 5a - Weighted Mean Changes in Productivity (Malmquist) 
 
Model Year SOB-4 Top-5 JSB Lower-5 JSB 
1998/97 1.0474*** 1.3861*** 2.2090*** 
1999/98 0.9692 1.2426 1.0510 
2000/99 0.9058*** 0.9819*** 0.7940*** 
2001/00 0.8987*** 0.9044*** 0.7840*** 
2002/01 0.9721*** 1.0741** 0.9207*** 
2003/02 0.9500*** 0.9787 0.8456*** 
2004/03 1.0642*** 1.0182 1.3756** 
2005/04 1.1154*** 1.1085*** 0.8609*** 
2006/05 0.8760*** 1.0267 0.9082*** 
1997/06 0.9409 1.8350*** 1.0949 
Model 1 
Loans  
Unadjusted 
2 inputs 
4 outputs 
    
1998/97 1.0202** 1.1099*** 1.1557*** 
1999/98 0.9841 1.0370 1.0490** 
2000/99 1.0235 0.9912 1.0032 
2001/00 1.0541** 0.8929*** 0.9244*** 
2002/01 1.0086 1.1093*** 1.0451* 
2003/02 0.9721*** 0.9543*** 0.9375*** 
2004/03 0.9963 1.0349 1.2462 
2005/04 0.9854 0.9658 0.9593 
2006/05 1.0457*** 1.0029 0.9393*** 
1997/06 0.9912 1.0240 1.1471 
Model 2 
Loans 
Unadjusted 
3 inputs 
3 outputs 
    
1998/97 1.0100*** 1.5740*** 2.1236*** 
1999/98 0.9720 1.2321*** 1.1266*** 
2000/99 0.9968 1.0392 0.9340 
2001/00 0.9642* 0.8812*** 0.7990*** 
2002/01 0.9793** 1.0601* 0.9093*** 
2003/02 0.8831*** 0.9373*** 0.8687*** 
2004/03 0.9795*** 0.9385** 1.0715*** 
2005/04 1.0511*** 1.0657*** 0.8861*** 
2006/05 0.8767*** 1.0450 0.9231** 
Model 3 
Loans adjusted 
2 inputs 
4 outputs 
1997/06 0.8417** 1.9463*** 1.2565** 
     
1998/97 1.0391*** 1.3754*** 1.1822*** 
1999/98 0.8773*** 1.0900** 1.1222*** 
2000/99 1.1032*** 1.0970*** 1.2217*** 
2001/00 0.9939 0.9010*** 0.9312*** 
2002/01 0.9744*** 1.1029*** 1.2080*** 
2003/02 0.9518*** 1.0137 0.9672 
2004/03 0.9875 0.9834 1.0341 
Model 4 
Loans adjusted 
3 inputs 
3 outputs 
2005/04 0.9715*** 0.9738 0.9351 
  
19 
 
2006/05 1.0685*** 1.0194 0.9416*** 
1997/06 0.9510 2.1974*** 2.0477*** 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10% 
 
Table 5b - Weighted Mean Changes in Efficiency (Catch-up) 
 
Model Year SOB Top 5 JSB Lower 5 JSB 
1998/97 0.9124 1.0034 1.4908* 
1999/98 0.9452 1.1260 1.2334 
2000/99 1.0980 0.8731 0.6195*** 
2001/00 0.8275*** 0.9687 0.8937 
2002/01 0.8654*** 1.0479 1.0795 
2003/02 0.9903 1.1818** 0.9505 
2004/03 0.9857 0.9661 0.8777 
2005/04 1.3681*** 1.3681 0.9143 
2006/05 0.9840 0.9998 0.8815* 
Model 1 
1997/06 0.9033 0.9271 0.7994* 
     
1998/97 1.0405 0.9381 0.9043 
1999/98 1.1994*** 1.1455* 1.1022 
2000/99 1.0488 0.9010 0.8745** 
2001/00 1.0125 0.9869 0.9987 
2002/01 0.8162*** 1.0159 1.0708 
2003/02 0.9309*** 0.9433 0.9197 
2004/03 0.9182** 0.9492 0.7849*** 
2005/04 0.9648 0.9759 1.1429** 
2006/05 1.0176 0.9866 0.9463 
Model 2 
1997/06 0.9527 0.7797*** 0.9015 
     
1998/97 0.8843 1.0907 1.5923** 
1999/98 0.6997*** 0.9417 0.8562 
2000/99 1.1559 0.9098 0.7959*** 
2001/00 0.8287*** 0.9444 0.9223 
2002/01 0.8870** 1.0569 1.0153 
2003/02 1.0111 1.1687*** 0.9818 
2004/03 0.9930 0.9019 1.1145 
2005/04 1.4162*** 1.0081 0.9886 
2006/05 0.9859 1.0115 0.8873 
Model 3 
1997/06 0.6838*** 0.8446 0.7248** 
     
1998/97 0.7628*** 0.9536 0.8164* 
1999/98 0.9692 1.0873 1.0199 
2000/99 0.9187 0.8688* 0.9381 
2001/00 0.9613 1.0122 1.0216 
2002/01 0.7993*** 1.0862 1.2010*** 
2003/02 0.9162*** 0.9287 0.8144*** 
2004/03 0.9973 0.9070 1.0098 
Model 4 
2005/04 0.9479** 0.9685 1.1590** 
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2006/05 1.0294 0.9966 0.9228 
1997/06 0.4329*** 0.7152*** 0.6496*** 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10% 
 
Table 5c - Weighted Mean Changes in Technology (Technical progress) 
 
Model Year SOB Top 5 JSB Lower 5 JSB 
1998/97 1.1726 1.4022** 1.4497** 
1999/98 1.0421 1.1467 0.8831 
2000/99 0.8708* 1.1677 1.3617** 
2001/00 1.0886 0.9553 0.8864 
2002/01 1.1364* 1.0920 0.8863 
2003/02 0.9720 0.8478 0.8940 
2004/03 1.0852 1.0802 3.1427*** 
2005/04 0.8203*** 1.1873 0.9609 
2006/05 0.8996 1.0505 1.0376 
Model 1 
1997/06 1.0271 2.0031*** 1.4296** 
     
1998/97 0.9844 1.1927*** 1.4968*** 
1999/98 0.8301*** 0.9274 0.9632 
2000/99 0.9949 1.1197 1.1812*** 
2001/00 1.0488 0.9106* 0.9324 
2002/01 1.2783*** 1.1936*** 0.9829 
2003/02 1.0470* 1.0169 1.0224 
2004/03 1.12812** 1.1264 4.0554*** 
2005/04 1.0250 1.0114 0.8581*** 
2006/05 1.0267 1.0295 1.0020 
Model 2 
1997/06 1.0618 1.3290*** 1.5166*** 
     
1998/97 1.1748 2.6606*** 1.3130* 
1999/98 1.4604*** 1.3542*** 1.3452** 
2000/99 0.9022 1.1531 1.1975* 
2001/00 1.1664** 0.9460 0.8696* 
2002/01 1.1312* 1.1268 0.9308 
2003/02 0.8836*** 0.8254*** 0.8896 
2004/03 0.9907 1.0559 0.9773 
2005/04 0.7441*** 1.0741 0.9055 
2006/05 0.8990 1.0573 1.0505 
Model 3 
1997/06 1.1938 3.5628*** 1.8122** 
     
1998/97 1.5591*** 2.5068*** 1.76969*** 
1999/98 0.9169 1.0391 1.1148 
2000/99 1.2116*** 1.2832*** 1.34073*** 
2001/00 1.0391 0.9014* 0.9205 
2002/01 1.2802*** 1.1168 1.0084 
2003/02 1.0438 1.1029* 1.1886*** 
2004/03 1.0006 1.0955 1.0388 
Model 4 
2005/04 1.0289 1.0253 0.8307*** 
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2006/05 1.0374 1.0357 1.0301 
1997/06 2.3739*** 3.3114*** 2.1407** 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10% 
 
The tables show the movements in productivity growth figures for each year, but the 
overall growth for the period 1997-2006 is more revealing. The difference between 
model 1 and model 2 is that deposits are treated as an output in model 1 and as an 
input in model 2. The ideal composition would have a proportion of demand deposits 
as an output (production of payment services) and time deposits as input for 
intermediation services. Therefore we can interpret the results from the two models as 
boundary values for actual productivity growth. The figures show that there was 
significant productivity growth on the basis of model 1 for the top 5 JSBs driven by 
technical progress (frontier shift) but no significant growth in productivity for the 
SOBs or the lower 5 JSBs. With model 2, there was no significant growth in overall 
productivity although there was significant technical progress outweighed by 
efficiency regress. 
 Models 3 and 4 treat NPLs as an undesirable output and the results are much 
clearer once NPLs have been taken out of the picture. The SOBs and top 5 JSBs 
register strong productivity growth in the case of model 3, driven by technological 
progress. The bottom 5 JSBs also face technological progress but outweighed by 
worsening average technical efficiency leading to no overall growth in productivity. 
However, with model 4 all the JSBs register strong productivity growth driven by 
technological progress (frontier shifts) but also significant mean efficiency regress. In 
the case of the SOBs there is strong productivity growth with model 3 but no 
significant growth with model 4.  
We can interpret the results from Models 3 and 4 in the following way. All the 
banks have had some productivity growth driven largely by technological progress. 
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However, this has favoured the benchmarks banks that have improved productivity 
faster than the rest leading to average efficiency regress. Figure 2 below summarises 
the performance of the three groups of banks according to the type of model against 
the null hypothesis of zero productivity growth (Malmquist index M = 1) 
Figure 2 
 
 
The bold line indicates the null of zero overall productivity growth (M = 1) for 
the full time period 1997-2006 under the assumption of each model. The SOBs show 
no significant productivity growth and show a significant productivity regress on the 
assumption of model 3, where NPLs are treated as a negative output and deposits are 
treated as an output. The top 5 JSBs show significant productivity growth in the case 
of model 1, model 3 and model 4 while the lower 4 JSBs show significant 
productivity growth in case of model 3 and model 4. The adjustment for NPLs 
indicates a marked difference in performance between the SOBs and the JSBs over 
the full period. The figure shows graphically that the Top 5 JSBs dominate in terms of 
overall performance followed by the remaining cluster of JSBs. 
SOB 
Top 5 - JSB 
Other JSB 
Model 1 
Model 2 
Model 3 
Model 4 
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We now turn to an analysis of the characteristics of productivity growth by 
examining its determinants. The raw material of what is to be explained on a yearly 
basis is the bootstrap mean value of the Malmquist productivity index for each bank 
under the assumption of each of the models 1-4. Table 6 shows some selected results 
from panel corrected heteroskedastic adjustment10. The bank specific variables are; 
LSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets, COST is the cost- income ratio, SOB is a 
dummy variable for state-owned banks, FOR is the foreign ownership stake given by 
Table 2, FEE is the proportion of revenue from net fees and commissions, IPO is a 
dummy variable for the year of the bank listing on the domestic stock exchange. 
 
Table 6: Dependant variable: Malmquist productivity index. Panel 
heteroskedastic adjusted standard errors; No: of obs=123, No: of groups=14.  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 3.51*** 2.38*** 1.83*** 1.71*** 3.49*** 2.45*** 2.07*** 1.99*** 
LSIZE -.19* -.11*** -.06*** -.06*** -.19* -.11** -.08*** .08*** 
COST -.003 - -.001 - -.001 - -.001 - 
SOB .315 - .152** .133** .312 - .133 .128 
FOR .017** .015*** .007*** .007*** .010 .008* .002 .002 
FEE .018*** .019*** .002* .002*** .016*** .017*** .003* .003** 
IPO -.129 -.152 .004 - -.146** -.176** -.020 - 
R-sq 0.1505 0.1310 0.1185 0.1078 0.1757 0.1533 0.1362 .1316 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% 
The two consistent determinants for all four models is size, measured by total assets, 
and the composition of revenue. The sign on the variable LSIZE suggests that the 
larger the bank, the lower the growth in productivity. An indicator of managerial 
                                                 
10 The standard fixed effects model was rejected on conventional F test for each of the models.  
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flexibility and capability to diversify output is given by the composition of earnings 
from off-balance sheet sources. The sign on FEE suggests that the greater the 
composition of fee income in revenue, the greater the productivity growth. There is 
weak evidence that foreign financial institutional shareholding is associated with 
higher productivity growth but this affect is weakened when NPLs are treated as an 
undesirable output. There is no evidence that productivity growth is obtained through 
cost reduction and there is little evidence that state-owned banks have a productivity 
advantage. The extension of ownership from state and local government to the 
domestic public through listing on the domestic exchanges has had mostly no 
statistical effect on productivity. Where significant, this variable enters with a 
negative sign.   
 
6.0  Conclusion   
This paper has used the Malmquist decomposition to quantify the productivity 
growth of Chinese banks in 1997-2006. The advantage of use the Malmquist method 
is that it separates the diffusion of technology (efficiency gains) from advances in 
technology (frontier shifts). The paper also applies bootstrapping techniques to 
evaluate significant changes in productivity, efficiency gains and innovation.  
Using deposits as an output, only the top 5 JSBs showed significant 
productivity gains driven by strong technological advances over this period. When 
deposits are treated as an input, productivity growth is zero with technological gains 
being offset by average efficiency regress. 
Once NPLs are treated as an undesirable output the picture becomes clearer. 
At best there is on average no productivity growth for the SOBs and at worst, there is 
average productivity regress. Technological gains have been swamped by average 
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efficiency losses. However, the JSBs show strong productivity growth driven by 
spectacular innovation effects. While adopting technologies that improved the 
productivity of the average JSB, the average JSB failed to keep up with the 
benchmark banks and moved further away from the frontier. 
An econometric analysis confirms that the larger banks had lower productivity 
growth than smaller banks. This may be explained by the political and social 
opposition the SOBs face in attempting to restructure factor inputs and downsize as a 
means of improving performance. It also explains the concentration of the activity of 
the Asset Management Companies on the SOBs in aiding the divestiture of their large 
NPL holdings. 
Higher productivity growth was also associated with banks that had diversified 
into non- interest earnings activity. The higher the proportion of revenue from non-
interest earnings indicates greater management flexibility and an increase in the 
productivity of the banks.  
The analysis also revealed weak evidence that the stronger the foreign 
financial institutional stake in the bank, the greater the productivity growth of the 
bank. However, as Table 2 shows, this aspect is relatively recent in the sample frame 
and until further data is available, requires a cautious assessment. 
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